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INSURABILITY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
George L. Priest*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses issues relating to the insurability of pu-
nitive damages awards. There is no clear consensus today whether
the law should allow insurance coverage of punitive damages. Our
courts conflict sharply: some deny coverage on grounds of public
policy; the majority allow coverage. Courts on both sides have re-
garded the insurability issue as implicating the most central goals
of modern tort law, but they have failed to generate a consensus
regarding whether coverage or the refusal of coverage best achieves
these goals.
Indeed, there is substantial confusion in each of the alterna-
tive judicial approaches to the insurability of punitive damages.
Many courts, for example, deny insurance coverage on grounds
that it violates public policy to allow insurance to diminish the de-
terrent effect of punitive awards, which is the awards' chief
function. Yet, even courts adopting this approach have crafted ex-
ceptions to the rule, allowing insurance coverage where the award
serves some compensatory purpose or where other legal principles,
such as strict vicarious liability, are implicated. The rationale for
these exceptions, however, is not well worked out. Courts have not
explained why there should be less concern over diminishing the
deterrent effect of vicarious liability or why and to what extent the
compensation goal should trump the deterrence goal.
Other courts have ruled, in contrast, that the deterrent effect
of punitive damages can be achieved even if insurance coverage is
allowed because insurers can raise premiums after an award or can
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build the expected cost of punitives ex ante into the premium. Yet
many of these courts refuse insurability where the underlying act
is criminal or clearly intentional, though the opportunity for pre-
mium adjustment would appear equivalent. Still other courts have
allowed insurance coverage of punitives even where the act is crim-
inal on the ground that the separate criminal penalty will achieve
the deterrent effect.
Confusion over punitives is not confined to the courts. The in-
surance industry itself appears confused on the issue. Insurability
litigation involves the assertion by insurers that the general terms
of a liability insurance policy should be read to deny coverage of
punitives. But this argument of the insurer is necessary only be-
cause the insurer for some reason has failed to incorporate a more
specific exclusion of punitive coverage into the basic policy itself.
The failure of insurers to commit for or against punitive coverage
has itself generated judicial schizophrenia on the issue. Many
courts are led to resolve the insurability issue on simple grounds of
insurance contract interpretation, while other courts-those that
insist on maintaining the integrity of the punitive deter-
rent-commonly view the terms of the insurance contract as
irrelevant. Some courts in fact have denied coverage on grounds of
public policy, though the insurer concedes that the contract must
be read to cover the punitive award.
This Article seeks to clarify these various issues through appli-
cation of the modern understanding of the economics of insurance.
Much of the contradiction in the judicial treatment of the insura-
bility of punitives directly implicates the operation of insurance
markets, in particular the disagreement over whether allowing cov-
erage impairs the deterrent function of punitive damages. But
other issues relating to insurability and, more generally, to the ap-
propriate role of punitive awards become clearer when the
economics of insurance are better understood. For example, simple
principles of insurance can explain how allowing coverage of puni-
tive awards affects the broader set of insureds and affects basic
liability insurance availability. As we shall see, these principles
show that the modern expansion of punitive damages liability, per-
haps ironically, has increased the ability of insurers to provide
effective insurance coverage of punitives, though it simultaneously
has diminished the availability of basic liability insurance for an
important segment of the insured population.
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These insurance principles also demonstrate the very close re-
lationship between the economic grounds for excluding punitive
coverage and the moral grounds for awarding punitive damages in
the first instance. The economic principles that define when the
insured population benefits from the exclusion of punitive coverage
parallel the moral grounds for punitive awards. The Article argues
that there is an inverse relationship between feasible insurance of
punitives and the moral or instrumental justification for punitive
awards. To the extent that the expansion of punitive damages
awards in modern times increases the feasibility of insuring puni-
tive liability, it diminishes the underlying moral justification for
punitive damages.
Part I describes briefly the current legal treatment of the in-
surability of punitive damages awards, documenting the disparate
judicial approaches to the question. Part II, then, demonstrates the
close relationship between the exclusion of insurance coverage and
the definition of punitive liability. Section A sets forth the simple
economics of insurance, explaining generally how insurance
reduces risks and which risks can be effectively insured. Section B
discusses the similarity between the economic grounds for insuring
risks and the moral or instrumental grounds for punitive damages
awards. Though this similarity has not been noticed in the legal or
judicial commentary on the issue, Section B implies that there ex-
ists a broad complementarity between the economic approach to
the insurability issue and the moral approach to punitive liability.
Part III applies the analysis developed in Part II to address
the effects of the modern expansion of punitive liability in terms of
both moral justification and insurance. It shows why the expansion
of liability increases demand for punitive coverage and why insur-
ers are placed in the increasingly difficult position of seeming to
provide general punitive coverage, yet at the same time litigating
coverage issues with increased vigor. Finally, Part ill also ad-
dresses the implications of punitive insurability for the moral
reform of punitive liability.
1. THE CONFUSION IN CURRENT ,ApPROACHES TOWARD PUNITIVE
INSURABILITY
Litigation over the insurability of punitive damages typically
raises one or both of two issues, though the two issues are closely
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related. First, many courts have ruled that the terms of the under-
lying insurance contract are irrelevant because the purpose of
punitive damages is to deter. Allowing a tortfeasor to purchase in-
surance for potential punitive damages would diminish the
deterrent effect of punitive liability in violation of public policy.
Indeed, according to the strongest version of this principle, even if
the insurance policy were expressly to provide punitive coverage,
the court would refuse enforcement. l Other courts, however, have
contested one or both of the underlying premises of this approach.
Some courts have held that punitive liability has a function be-
yond deterrence that would not be impaired by allowing insurance
coverage. Other courts have denied that insurance coverage of
punitives would significantly diminish the deterrent effect.
The second issue in punitive insurability cases arises only af-
ter courts have gone beyond the purist deterrent obstacle. Once a
court is willing to entertain punitive insurability, it still must ex-
amine the underlying insurance policy to determine whether its
terms provide for coverage. That is, the next issue is whether the
policy extended or excluded coverage of losses from the acts gener-
ating punitive liability. Of course, the interpretation of insurance
policies often is closely related to courts' views of the deterrence
function. Courts commonly will attempt to construe insurance con-
tracts in a manner that does least harm to the deterrent objective
of punitive liability.
A. Insurance Coverage and the Deterrent Objective of Punitive
Liability
The judicial approach toward the insurability of punitive dam-
ages has been tremendously influenced by Judge Wisdom's
powerful 1962 opinion in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
McNulty,2 denying insurance coverage. According to Judge Wis-
1. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (lOth Cir. 1966); Northwestern Nat'l Casu-
alty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962), superseded in part by VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-2271 (1986); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
2. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962), superseded in part by VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2·2271
(l986). Because the federal court was interpreting Florida and Virginia law. the decision still
accurately states Florida's public policy of prohibiting insurance coverage of punitive dam-
ages. However, as explained by the Supreme Court of Virginia in United Servs. Auto. Ass'n
v. Webb, 235 Va. 655, 369 S.E.2d 196 (1988), the Virginia legislature enacted legislation
providing that it is not against the public policy of the state to provide insurance coverago
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dom, the clear purpose of a punitive damages award is to punish
and deter. This objective mandates that "damages rest ultimately
as well [as] nominally on the party actually responsible for the
wrong."3 The court further reasoned that "[i]f that person were
permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive
damages would serve no useful purpose."4 The court explained
that allowing coverage, more realistically, would place the burden
of the punitive levy not on the insurer, but on the insured public
as a whole, since the punitive amount would be passed along to
insureds in larger premiums.1S But this result should not occur,
stated the court, because, in effect, society would be punishing it-
self for the wrong committed by the insured.6
Judge Wisdom's opinion remains in force.' It has been fol-
lowed by many jurisdictionsB and has defined the debate for all
others. The more modern approach to the insurability issue, how-
ever, has been extension of insurance coverage to punitive damages
by de-emphasizing concerns over the deterrent effect of punitives
that were central to McNulty. Some courts have bluntly denied
that disallowing insurance coverage of punitive damages would de-
ter particularly egregious acts.9 One court ruled that coverage
of punitive damages so long as they do not arise from intentional conduct, thus superseding
McNulty in Virginia. [d. at 657, 369 S.E.2d at 197.
3. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440. The court emphasized that these reasons were especially
strong in the context, as in this case, of drunken drivers: "[S)ocially irresponsible automo-
bile drivers [ought not) escape the element of personal punishment in punitive damages
when they are guilty of reckless slaughter or maiming on the highway." Id. at 441.
4. Id. at 440.
5. Id. at 442.
6. Id. The court also believed that allowing coverage of punitive damages would create
a conflict of interest between the insurer and insured in settlement negotiations, and that
there would be difficulties in assessing punitive damages with reference to the financial
standing of the defendant without referring to the defendant's insurance coverage. Id. at
441.
7. Judge Wisdom was interpreting the law of Florida and Virginia. For a more recent
Florida decision following McNulty, see U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061
(Fla. 1983). But see United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Webb, 235 Va. 655, 369 S.E.2d 196 (1988)
(in Virginia, McNulty has been superseded by VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2·227 (1986), which al·
lows insurance coverage of punitive damages assessed as a result of negligence, including
willful and wanton conduct, but not of punitive damages assessed for intentional conduct).
8. See the cases cited in Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts
Take the Smart out of "Smart Money," 40 U. MlAr.u L. REv. 979, 1000-01 n.84 (1986).
,9. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, -. 383 S.W.2d 1,5
(1964) (drunk driving not deterrable by this means).
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should be allowed because there is no firm evidence of greater de-
terrence in states disallowing coverage.10
Still other courts have rationalized that allowing insurance
coverage of punitive liability does not remove the deterrent effect
of punitive damages. In one case, the court emphasized that the
insurer had probably taken the prospect of punitive liability into
account in the initial determination of the premium.ll Slightly dif-
ferently, in Brown v. Maxey,!2 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
asserted that an insured must still fear that the insurer will charge
a higher premium after paying a punitive award or that the puni-
tive award may exceed the insurance policy limits.13 In a similar
recent decision, Baker v. Armstrong,!" the New Mexico Supreme
Court emphasized the prospect of higher premiums and policy can-
cellation as strong deterrents to bad driving notwithstanding
coverage of punitive liability.ll1 In still another case involving puni-
tive liability for a criminal act, the court regarded the separate
criminal sanctions as a sufficient deterrent, thus allowing punitive
coverage.16
Other courts have suppressed the deterrence concern on other
grounds. Some courts, for example, have stated that because insur-
ance in some contexts is compulsory-for example, auto
insurance-it would be inconsistent to deny insurance coverage for
any auto-related liability.17 Other courts have interpreted the pur-
pose of punitive awards to be, at least in part, compensatory,
trumping the deterrence concern.IS
10. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972).
11. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 242, 389 A.2d 369, 367
(1978).
12. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
13. Brown, 124 Wis. at 446-47,369 N.W.2d at 688.
14. 106 N.M. 395, 744 P.2d 170 (1987).
15. Baker, 106 N.M. at 398, 744 P.2d at 173.
16. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 624
(1972) (drag racing could be punished by criminal penalties of loss of driver's license and
required attendance in traffic school).
17. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tringali, 686 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1982):
Martin v. Chicago Ins. Co., 184 Ga. App. 472, 473, 361 S.E.2d 835, 837, cert. denied, 184 Ga.
App. 472, 361 S.E.2d 835 (1987).
18. Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 537·38, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941)
(dictum).
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B. Punitives and the Meaning of the Exclusion of Intentional
Acts
Once a court has rejected the summary refusal of punitive cov-
erage on public policy grounds, it must interpret the terms of the
underlying liability insurance policy to determine whether it pro-
vides coverage of punitive liability. In every case that I have seen,
the underlying policy provides in language either identical or
closely similar, that the insurer agrees
to pay on behalf of the insured the ultimate net loss ... which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages by reason
of the liability imposed upon the insured by law ... because of (a)
Personal Injury [sometimes "Bodily Injury"] ... caused by or aris-
ing out of an occurrence [sometimes "occurrence or accident"].
The policy defines "ultimate net loss" as
the total sum which the insured ... become[s] obligated to pay by
reason of Personal Injury.
And the policy defines "occurrence" (or "accident") as
an event ... which results in Personal Injury ... neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.IS
The legal issue is whether these provisions of the insurance con-
tract compel the insurer to compensate the insured for punitive
liability.
Two issues have arisen most commonly in insurance contract
construction. Some cases have involved the legal question of
whether punitive liability implies something other than liability for
personal injury. This issue, however, has been resolved most com-
monly in favor of coverage on the basis of the reference in the
definition of "ultimate net loss" to coverage of "the total sum
which the insured ... become[s] obligated to pay."20 The far more
common context of the insurability issue is litigation over the
meaning of the term "occurrence" or "accident." Typically, the in-
surer maintains that the act of the insured generating punitive
liability should be regarded as, in some sense, intentional, thus ex-
19. See, e.g., American Home Assurance v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693,
695 (TeL Ct. App. 1987).
20. Carraway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 205, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965); see also la-
zenby v. Universal Underwriters, Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d I, 5 (1964).
HeinOnline -- 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1016 1988-1989
1016 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 40:3:1009
cluded from insurance coverage because the term "occurrence" or
"accident" is defined in the policy as an act not intended by the
insured.
The source of confusion in this area of law derives from the
lack of correspondence between these terms of the underlying in-
surance policy and the legal standards for the award of punitive
damages. Of course, there is less controversy where punitive dam-
ages are awarded expressly because the tortious act is
"intentional."21 The confusion arises instead because courts impose
punitive liability in many other contexts as well, such as where the
tortious act is "willful and wanton," "reckless," "grossly negli-
gent," "outrageous," or "shocking to the conscience."22 The legal
issue in these cases is whether acts defined according to these
terms are or are not excluded from coverage by the "neither ex-
pected nor intended" policy clause.
There seems very wide agreement that criminal fines are not
insurable,23 both on grounds of the deterrence policy and because
criminal fines commonly require evidence of intent.24 Many courts
also have held that, where punitive civil liability derives from an
underlying criminal act, insurance coverage will be denied, largely
for the same reasons.2G As described above, however, growing mod-
ern disbelief in the deterrent effect of prohibiting insurance
coverage of punitive liability has undermined this approach.26 In-
deed, in one case, a court held punitive liability to be insurable
because the underlying act was criminal.27 According to the court,
allowing the tortfeasor to pass on punitive liability to the insurer
would not diminish deterrence of similar acts causing harm be-
cause of the prospect of separate criminal punishment.28
It is a well-known feature of modern insurance coverage juris-
prudence that courts are increasingly interpreting insurance
21. But see infra text accompanying notes 32-43.
22. For a state-by-state description of standards for punitive liability, seo R.
SCHLOERB. R. BLATI. R. HAMMESFAHR & L. NUGENT. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO TilE
INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES (1988).
23. See, e.g., Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407, 412·13 (\V.D. Pa. 1966).
aff'd, 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967). But see infra text accompanying noto 27.
24. See, e.g., Kraus, 258 F. Supp. at 412-13.
25. See, e.g., Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (1934) (dic-
tum), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
27. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
28. Price, 108 Ariz. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524.
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policies in ways that expand insurance coverage. These develop-
ments have affected the punitive liability issue as well. Some
courts in punitive cases have adopted as an interpretive technique
the policy of construing the contract against the interests of the
insurer because the insurer drafted the policy.29 Other courts have
adopted the more modest technique of interpreting only contrac-
tual ambiguities against the interests of the insurer.3o Still other
courts have explicitly interpreted the contract with the purpose of
allowing rather than denying coverage.31 Each of these interpretive
techniques expands the insurability of punitive damages.
Though many courts have held that acts which are clearly in-
tentional are excluded by the "neither expected nor intended"
clause,32 other courts have given greater consideration to the mean-
ing of the term "intent." One court, for example, recently held that
coverage was allowed for punitive damages resulting from liability
to a woman who had intentionally cut the brake cable on her auto-
mobile.33 According to the court, the woman may have intended
suicide, but she did not intend necessarily to cause damage to
others; thus, the harm was accidental rather than intentional.:W
Other courts have distinguished between intentional acts and in-
tentional injuries, allowing .coverage though the act was
intentional, because the specific injury was accidentaJ.3G Another
modern court denied liability coverage of a woman who intention-
ally collided with another vehicle, but allowed collision coverage
under the policy of the woman's husband who, apparently, had not
shared his wife's intenV6
There has been similar disagreement among courts over the
applicability of the "neither expected nor intended" clause to ac-
.
29. E.g., American Home Assurance v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W. 2d 693,702
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
30. E.g., Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho
501,507,511 P.2d 783, 789 (1973).
31. E.g., Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Potter, 330 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1983).
32. TransAmerica Ins. Co. v. Cannon-Lowden Co., 400 F. Supp. 817 (D. Mont. 1975)
(suicidal head-on collision); Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berry, 123 Mich. App. 634,
333 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. App. 1983) (intentional arson); Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 78
N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952) (rape).
33. Potter, 330 N.W.2d 263.
34. Id. at 266. But see TransAmerica Ins. Co., 440 F. Supp. at 818-19..
35. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Shields, 31 Mich. App. 649, 661-62, 187 N.W.2d 894, 901
(1971).
36. Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Strong, 102 Wash. 2d 665, 689 P.2d 68 (1984).
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tions that fall short of clear intention. Thus, some courts have
denied coverage of punitive liability stemming from willful and
wanton behavior;37 other courts, however, have emphasized that
the willful and wanton standard falls short of clear intent, and
these courts have allowed punitive coverage.3S Similarly, some
courts have denied coverage of punitives deriving from grossly neg-
ligent acts;39 yet, other courts have allowed coverage of the grossly
negligent.4o Some courts have denied coverage of punitive liability
from reckless or grossly reckless behavior;41 however, most have al-
lowed coverage on the ground that there is often small difference
between reckless behavior and negligent behavior, which is clearly
insurable.42 These different interpretations stem largely from the
modern trend toward expansive coverage interpretation as well as
the modern undermining of the deterrence policy.43 As a general
matter, decisions prior to the last decade are much more likely to
deny insurance coverage of punitive damages; modern decisions, to
allow coverage.
Indeed, the tendency to allow coverage of punitive damages
characteristic of the modern approach has accelerated in recent
years; courts have emphasized, as an independent ground for al-
lowing coverage in the cases before them, the empirical fact that
increasing numbers of rulings allow coverage. Thus, several courts
have adopted the bootstrapping logic that coverage of punitives
should be allowed because insureds increasingly expect that courts
37. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972).
38. E.g., Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill.•App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969).
One court, in fact, argued that the willful and wanton character of an act is a factor that
directly gravitates in favor of coverage. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957). The insurer had asserted that,
because the underlying action was characterized as "willful and wanton" to merit punitive
damages, it should be regarded as intentional, rather than accidental The court responded,
however, that to accept this argument "would lead to the illogical and indefensible result,
contrary to the purpose and spirit of liability insurance policies[:) ... the more extreme the
recklessness, the more likely the insurer would be to escape liability," ld. at 827.
39. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
40. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
41. E.g., Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
42. E.g., Thornton, 244 F.2d at 827.
43. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
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will allow insurance coverage of punitive liability.H Other courts,
taking only a more general version of the same approach, have con-
cluded that, since punitive damages themselves are being awarded
so frequently in modern times, it is increasingly difficult to distin-
guish between negligent and punitive liability for purposes of
insurance coverage.45
Finally, still other coUrts have emphasized the apparent incon-
sistency of insurers themselves on the insurability issue as a reason
to allow coverage of punitives. Presumably, insurers are highly in-
terested in deterring harmful activities for which they may have to
pay. But many courts in recent years have emphasized that, de-
spite the long history of litigation over the meaning of the "neither
expected nor intended" clause, insurers have not acted to clarify
the issue by expressly excluding punitive liability from coverage:U1
The failure of insurers to exclude punitive coverage, thus, has
served importantly to expand punitive coverage.
II. THE OPERATION OF INSURANCE, THE DETERMINATION OF
INSURABLE RISKS, AND THE DEFINITION OF PUNITIVE LIABILITY
Understanding how insurance markets operate is central to
the evaluation of the effects of allowing or disallowing insurance
coverage of punitive damages. Section A explains how insurance
reduces risks. It shows that there are clear constraints on the na-
ture of risks that can be effectively reduced through the insurance
mechanism. Section A describes why some risks are uninsurable
and, thus, why insurers exclude coverage of certain risks in the ba-
sic liability policy. As we shall see, the exclusion of coverage of
such risks expands insurance availability by allowing the offering
of broader basic insurance coverage or basic coverage at a lower
premium, making insurance available to individuals or firms that
might not purchase insurance otherwise. Since all humane societies
aspire to maximize compensation of the injured, there is substan-
44. E.g., Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W. 2d 106, 101
(Iowa 1983). But see from an earlier time, Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.•
177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (insured has no right to expect coverage).
45. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1. 5
(1964).
46. E.g., Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 396, 398·99, 744 P.2d 170, 171. 173-74
(1987); American Home Assurance v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W. 2d 693, 701-02 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987).
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tial social benefit derived from increasing the prospects for broad
compensation insurance for victims of tortious activity.
Section B, then, discusses the definition of punitive liability. It
shows the close similarity between the economic definition of risks
excluded from insurance coverage and the moral definition of acts
subjected to punitive damages.
A. How Insurance Can Reduce (Certain) Risks
Insurance operates where losses have some stochastic or prob-
abilistic character. A loss that is certain to occur in some particular
period cannot be insured against; one can only accumulate savings
before the loss occurs or after the loss is suffered to restore the
previous economic position. In contrast, for insurance to reduce
the risk level, the insured losses must be probabilistic, either as to
whether the losses will occur at all (for example, whether a product
will prove defective) or as to when losses certain to occur actually
will occur (for example, whether one will die before or after full life
expectancy).
For a loss or a set of losses to be probabilistic means that the
occurrence of the loss or set can be described by a probability dis-
tribution. The mean of the distribution represents the most likely
probability of occurrence of the loss; the distribution or error term
surrounding the mean represents the greater or lesser likelihood
that the loss or set of losses will occur. The expected cost of the
loss is determined by summing the amount of the loss weighted by
these probabilities. Obviously, whatever the mean expected magni-
tude of the loss, the broader the probability distribution around
the mean, the greater the total expected cost. More precisely, given
some mean, expected cost is determined by the variance of the dis-
tribution around the mean. The variance of the distribution
measures the risk associated with the loss.47
Insurance can reduce the risk of losses by aggregating uncorre-
lated losses. To the degree that losses are uncorrelated (that is,
47. The variance of a distribution is the sum of the squares of the differences between
the mean of the distribution and each random variable:
variance = 172 = ~(X-X)2, where x = the mean of the distribution and X. each random
variable.
HeinOnline -- 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1021 1988-1989
1989] Insurability 1021
statistically independent),48 aggregation will reduce variance by
leading the error terms of the risks to cancel out. Aggregation does
not change the extent of underlying loss. But the cumulative risk
of loss, measured by the variance of the distribution, can be re-
duced by aggregation, again, to the extent the individual risks are
statistically independent. For statistically independent risks, the
sum of the aggregated risks is less than the sum of the risks taken
individually.
This risk-reducing function derives from operation of the law
of large numbers-the empirical phenomenon according to which
the probability density function of a loss tends to become concen-
trated around the mean as the sample number increases.49 The law
of large numbers implies that as one increases the number of in-
sured persons possessing independent and identically valued risks,
one increases the accuracy of prediction of the risk generated by
each individual. The increase in predictive accuracy derives from
the reduction in the variance of risk of expected outcomes.
It is important here to distinguish between employing a large
population of insureds to shift losses and employing a large popu-
lation of insureds to reduce the risk level by cancelling out risk
terms. Many scholars refer to insurance as loss spreading, but
there is an important difference between simply spreading losses
and reducing risks. The difference is that, to the extent the losses
and accompanying risks are truly independent, their aggregation
not only spreads them, diminishing the impact of a loss on an indi-
vidual insured, it also reduces the total risk level of the pool below
the preaggregated sum of individual risks. This reduction of the
total risk level is the result of the operation of the law of large
numbers on statistically independent risks: it increases the ability
to predict the risk level (which is what is meant by cancelling out
risk terms).
Loss spreading, in contrast, serves only a distributional end.
Spreading does not change the risk level; it merely distributes ex-
isting risks across a set of the population different from the set
that suffered the risks in the first instance. The law of large num-
bers will not apply if the risks faced by members of the pool are
48. Losses are statistically independent if the occurrence of one loss does not affect
the probability of occurrence of the other.
49. See MarshaIl, Insurance Theory: Reserves Versus Mutuality, 12 EcON. INQUIRY
476 (1974).
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not statistically independent to some degree. Aggregating such
risks would be unproductive because the reserves an insurer would
have to maintain would equal or, perhaps, exceed the reserves indi-
yiduals would have to maintain if they were uninsured.GO
By reducing the risk level, effective risk aggregation reduces
the premium necessary to insure a given risk. This can mean that
fuller insurance coverage (larger insurance benefits) can be offered
for the same dollar premium. Or it can mean that insurance can be
made more broadly available for risks that would otherwise be un-
insured. In contrast, loss spreading, because it does not change the
risk level, cannot directly achieve any of these benefits.
A closely related method of reducing risks is by risk segrega-
tion: the insurer attempts to distinguish relatively high-risk from
low-risk insureds and then to assign them to narrowly defined risk
pools. In the insurance industry, risk pool definition is referred to
as insurance underwriting.
Precise risk pool definition extends insurance availability by
controlling adverse selection. Adverse selection is a problem cen-
tral to every insurance context. An insurer must collect into a risk
pool individuals with a sufficiently narrow range of exposure to risk
for the insurance to remain financially attractive to each member
of the pool. Since insurance premiums must be set according to the
average level of risk brought to the pool, the wider the range be-
tween high-risk and low-risk pool members, the greater the
difference between the average risk and the risk of the low-risk
members. If the disparity between the premium and the risks
added by low-risk members becomes too substantial, low-risk
members will drop out of the pool because they find alternative
means of protection cheaper than market insurance. At the ex-
treme, as low-risk members drop out, the insurance pool will
unravel.51 One of the most important reasons that some risks are
uninsurable is that insurers are unable to narrow the assortment of
risks within a risk pool. Those insurers who are better at identifica-
tion and segregation can offer lower premiums to low-risk insureds
and can thus extend insurance availability.
50. See Marshall, supra note 49, at 477.
51. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons"; Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). For examples of the unravelling effect in commercinllinbility
insurance, see generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1576-78 (1987).
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It is well established that the more precisely insurers can seg-
regate risks by insurance discrimination of this nature, the more
broadly insurance can be offered in the society.tll! A court that
wanted to maximize insurance availability in the society would
adopt policies that encouraged maximally effective discrimination
in order to segregate risks into the narrowest possible pools. The
difference between the view of insurance as loss-spreading and in-
surance as risk-reducing becomes quite sharp at this point. Loss
spreading is often defended solely on distributional grounds:
Spreading shifts the costs of bearing losses away from parties that
generate them to parties viewed as better able to bear them-for
example, assigned risk pools in auto or medical malpractice insur-
ance that shift the costs generated by more risky drivers or doctors
to the less risky.53 Loss shifting of this nature can only be achieved
by compulsion and can only be defended on grounds of moral pref-
erence.54 But the implications of loss shifting of this nature are
often neglected. By defeating the risk-reduction benefits of segre-
gation, this form of loss shifting increases the risk level, increases
the underlying injury level, and reduces insurance availability. The
gains to the subsidized high-risk insureds are paid for in increased
risk, increased injury, and less available insurance, losses often ig-
nored in the emphasis on simple loss spreading.
The aggregation and segregation functions of insurance, then,
are similar in both method and effect: Both serve to increase pre-
dictive accuracy in order to reduce the risk level and the effective
costs of injuries. Reducing injury costs, however, necessarily gener-
ates offsetting effects. Where expected injury costs are lower, the
underlying level of activity and the underlying injury rate will in.!
crease, a phenomenon known as moral hazard.till All insurance
regimes generate this effect. Moral hazard increases the costs of
52. See Rothschild & Stiglitz. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Es·
say on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcON. 629 (1976): Crocker & Snow,
The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discriminotion in the Insurance Industry. 94 J. POL.
ECON. 321 (1986).
53. See G. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANAL,\'slS 36-54
(1970), for many other examples.
54. Dean Calabresi openly admits this point. Id. at 278-85.
55. The costs of the increase in injuries because of insurance will be less than the
reduction in effective costs achieved by insurance; otherwise. there will be no effective de-
mand for insurance.
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injuries and, thus, increases the risk level. Insurers will attempt to
control moral hazard by the definition of insurance coverage.
Insurers will constrain or, at the limit, exclude coverage of
losses particularly susceptible to insured moral hazard. The omni-
present exclusion in life insurance policies of coverage for death by
suicide is an obvious example. The exclusion serves to control
moral hazard by removing the incentive that providing large mone-
tary amounts to beneficiaries would add to other forces compelling
the act.56 Less dramatically, the exclusion in consumer product
warranties of coverage of easily broken glass parts or the easily
marred product finish, or the exclusion in auto warranties of cover-
age of engine damage from racing or towing heavy loads serves a
similar function. 57 These exclusions place the burden of loss on the
insured itself, increasing insured preventive effortsG8 and, at the
same time, culling out (segregating) high-risk insureds relatively
more susceptible to such losses.59
The beneficial effects of coverage exclusions as a method of
controlling moral hazard have been largely neglected. Because
these insurance provisions directly allocate losses to the insured,
their existence might seem antithetical to broad loss spreading.
But here again the limitations of the loss spreading metaphor be-
come clear. A coverage exclusion admittedly places all of some
identified loss on the insured. To this extent, it constrains loss
spreading. But as such provisions lower total insurance costs, they
allow the extension of basic insurance benefits more broadly to the
society. Thus, for example, the exclusion of life insurance coverage
56. Today, life insurance policies typically exclude coverage for death by suicide only
for the first two policy years. It is not clear that the two-year limitation on the exclusion
derives from insurer judgment that two years is a sufficient margin to control moral hazard.
More probably, the limitation derives from direct regulatory pressure or indirect judicial
pressure manifesting the desire to allow coverage whenever possible and the consequent
refusal to enforce exclusions deemed unreasonable. In 1987, only 1.4% of deaths of life in-
surance policyholders were by suicide. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE. 1988 LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 100. It is implausible that 98.6 percent of life insureds would volunta·
rily wish to purchase coverage for the purpose of covering death by suicide after the second
policy year.
57. See generally Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297 (1981), for many other examples [hereinafter Priest, Product Warranty].
58. Direct risk monitoring by insurers (such as requiring the installation of specific
safety devices and inspecting for compliance) is very similar to the control of moral hazard
by exclusions.
59. Deductibles and coinsurance provisions serve a similar function. See Priest, Inter-
nalizing Costs (unpublished mimeograph 1989) (available from the author).
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to suicides allows the premium for basic life insurance to be lower
and makes it possible for some individuals who would not or could
not purchase life insurance at a higher premium to obtain basic life
insurance protection. Thus, paradoxically, denying insurance cov-
erage to particular high risks through coverage exclusions can
maximize the availability of basic insurance coverage to the
society.
With this introduction, it is possible to evaluate with greater
clarity the purpose of the exclusion from insurance coverage of oc-
currences expected or intended by the insured, the exclusion that
figures centrally in the punitive insurability cases. As described
above, insurance is only possible where the underlying risks are
probabilistic and where the risks are not susceptible to insured
moral hazard.
The coverage exclusion of occurrences expected by the insured
represents an obvious effort to constrain insurance to probabilistic
risks. If the insured knows or expects that a particular occurrence
will happen, the loss caused by the occurrence cannot be said to be
probabilistic and, thus, cannot be effectively insured.
The exclusion of occurrences intended by the insured repre-
sents a direct effort to control insured moral hazard. The point is
obvious. No one would contest that it is in the interest of an in-
surer (as well as of the society) for the insurer to encourage all
feasible precautions to reduce the likelihood of unintended harm.
Insurers will commonly compel insureds to install sprinkling sys-
tems, for example, or engage in periodic safety inspections to
reduce the accident rate. If these insurer efforts reduce the risk
level and increase insurance availability, insurer efforts to control
intentional harm-causing activities, a fortiori, will have similar
effect.
Put in economic terms, activities of insureds are differentially
susceptible to marginal incentives from insurance. Where the exis-
tence of insurance significantly reduces marginal incentives to
reduce harm, the harms become uninsurable. An act for which the
occurrence is subject to the volition of the insured is highly suscep-
tible to insurance incentives: the existence of insurance directly
reduces the costs of such acts and makes them uninsurable. To
give a concrete example, potential life insurance benefits obviously
increase incentives for suicide. As a consequence, life insurers must
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exclude coverage of suicide for some period.60 Similarly, to the ex-
tent that insurance provides coverage of losses intentionally caused
to neighbors,61 the level of community tolerance is likely to decline.
Put more generally, the definition of insurance coverage can
be described as an effort of the insurer to provide the broadest
-level of insurance to some dominant set of the insured population.
In terms of risk proclivity, the population of insureds can be seen
as arrayed along a continuum, from the lowest to the highest risk.
The level of insurance coverage that can be made available will
depend upon differences in risk proclivity and the costs associated
with the underlying risks. Insurers will maximize insurance by de-
fining coverage so that it best meets the insurance needs of the
dominant set of insureds. It follows necessarily that risks which are
not insurable either because they are not probabilistic in nature or
because they are highly susceptible to insured moral hazard will be
excluded from coverage. Such exclusions place the costs of ex-
cluded activities upon the individuals controlling the acts and thus
reduce the extent of underlying harm.
The exclusion of coverage of losses intended by the insured
thus benefits two classes of individuals. The first class is the
broader set of insureds not intentionally engaging in acts causing
harm. These insureds gain because the costs of intentional harm-
causing activities will not be averaged into the premiums they pay.
In this sense, it might be said that the dominant set of insureds
expresses market demand for the exclusion of intentional acts. The
second set of beneficiaries is those that might suffer loss if insur-
ance for intentional acts were available. That is, the number of
intentional harm-causing actions and the extent of harm intention-
ally caused would be higher if insurance coverage were available
than if coverage were excluded. As a consequence, some set of po-
tential victims benefits from the insurance exclusion.
60. See supra note 56.
61. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Smith, 376 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App. 1985) (punitive
damages coverage denied in case involving death of woman resulting from homeowner firing
several shots into neighboring residence).
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B. Uninsurable Risks and the Normative Grounds for Punitive
Awards
There is a close similarity between the definition of losses ex-
cluded from insurance coverage and the definition of actions
subject to punitive liability. Our society characterizes those acts
appropriate for punitive liability variously: acts that are reckless,
grossly negligent, willful and wanton, outrageous, morally shocking.
These various terms may be more or less descriptive in specific fac-
tual contexts. Each of these terms suggests, however, that those
actions subject to punitive liability stand apart by a substantial
distance from the range of activities normal for, or common to, the
larger mass of citizens.
In each of these two processes of definition, the activities of
the society may be seen as arrayed upon a continuum. In the insur-
ance context, risks that are extreme, grossly different from the
risks faced by the dominant set of insurance purchasers, must be
excluded from coverage. The coverage exclusion compels those en-
gaging in the harm-causing acts to pay their own way, rather than
averaging the much higher costs they generate into the premiums
paid by the larger population of insureds.
The definition of acts made subject to punitive liability is
closely similar, though the reference in this context is to a contin-
uum of moral justification rather than to a continuum of risks. Our
society punishes by means of punitive liability actions that are
morally extreme, grossly different on a moral plane from the ac-
tions of the dominant set of citizens. Punitive liability is a form of
moral exclusion of behavior. Punitive liability compels those en-
gaging in such acts to bear themselves the moral burden of their
actions. Punitive liability distinguishes certain types of behavior
from the behavior that is average or normal to the citizenry.
Rather than embracing such behavior as within the range of the
morally acceptable, punitive liability segregates and excludes such
behavior from the acceptable moral pool.
The similarity between the continuum of risks and the contin-
uum of moral justification suggests the potential for resolution of
the issue of the insurability of punitive damages. It is equally in
the public interest to exclude coverage of losses generated at the
extreme of the risk continuum as it is to punish with punitive
damages actions at the extreme of the moral continuum. The key
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to a resolution derives from comparing the set of actions that can-
not be insured and thus must be excluded from coverage with the
set of actions that the society condemns with punitive liability.
Currently, neither the terms of existing insurance policies nor
the legal definitions constituting the grounds for imposition of pu-
nitive liability provide much assistance in making this comp·arison.
The exclusion of acts "intended by the insured" is vague and does
not provide guidance regarding the point along the risk continuum
at which the actions of an insured become uninsurable. Similarly,
the legal terms describing behavior subject to punitive Habil-
ity-"willful and wanton," "grossly negligent," "shocking to the
conscience"-though evocative, do not define clearly the boundary
along the moral continuum dividing the merely tortious from ac-
tions so morally extreme as to be punished punitively. The
increasing judicial difficulty in distinguishing acts subject to puni-
tive liability from the merely negligent is a confession of the
point.62
The next Part attempts to employ the understanding of insur-
ance to clarify this relationship. It describes how the reference to
acts "intended by the insured" might be defined to focus more
clearly on truly uninsurable risks. Current judicial interpretations
of the clause have drawn largely from concepts of intent character-
istic of other legal fields, such as the criminal law, rather than from
the role of intent in insurance. As we shall see, there are many
ways for courts to redefine the policy clause to enhance insurance
availability.
Part III also addresses the relationship between actions that
are uninsurable and actions so morally extreme as to justify puni-
tive liability. Part III argues that, although the moral definition of
acts deserving punitive liability is likely to extend beyond the eco-
nomic definition of uninsurable acts, the insurance definition sets a
lower bound for punitive liability. It is an implication of this ap-
proach that to the extent the modern expansion of punitive
liability makes punitive damages insurable, it violates the moral
justification for the punitive levy.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
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III. DEFINING "ACTIONS INTENDED BY THE INSURED" TO ENHANCE
INSURANCE AVAILABILITY
This Part seeks to apply insurance principles to the interpre-
tation of the policy exclusion of "actions intended by the insured."
The objective here is straightforward. Part II showed that the ex-
clusion of risks substantially different from risks faced by the
dominant population of insureds serves both to enhance insurance
availability and to reduce the accident rate. Excluding coverage of
extreme risks lowers the premium for basic insurance coverage or
allows the extension of basic benefits. Both effects better achieve
the broader social goal of providing greater compensation for the
injured. In addition, however, the exclusion of coverage of extreme
risks will affect the level of activities generating such risks, reduc-
ing the underlying accident rate. Thus, the exclusion of coverage of
extreme risks simultaneously achieves two unambiguously impor-
tant policy goals: extending basic compensation and reducing the
extent of underlying injury.
As we shall see, current judicial interpretations of the clause
are vastly different from interpretations that would achieve these
effects. Because litigation involving the clause implicates the crimi-
nal-like imposition of punitive damages, courts have most typically
defined "actions intended by the insured" by reference to criminal
law concepts of intent. There is no reason to believe, however, that
concepts of intent drawn from the criminal law will correspond to
concepts of intent appropriate for enhancing insurance availability
because the ambitions and concerns implicit in these legal fields
are so different.
At the minimum, it is clear that insurance availability could
be enhanced and the injury rate reduced if "actions intended by
the insured" were defined with reference to the prerequisites of in-
surability. A minimally sufficient definition is that an action should
be regarded as "intended by the insured" if the loss from the ac-
tion is uninsurable either because the loss is not probabilistic or
because it is highly susceptible to insured moral hazard.63 At base,
this definition identifies those actions for which insurance cannot
reduce risks. As shown in Part II, insurance is only effective as a
risk-reducing mechanism where losses are probabilistic and not
63. Note that there is a substantial overlap between these definitions: Actions highly
susceptible to moral hazard by the insured are not truly probabilistic.
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vulnerable to insured moral hazard. It follows that to interpret
such actions to be within the scope of insurance coverage would
unambiguously reduce insurance availability because the addition
to the premium for basic coverage would preclude insurance for
some set of marginal insurance purchasers. It also follows that to
allow coverage of such actions would increase insured moral haz-
ard, thus increasing the underlying injury rate.
The current judicial approach to the interpretation of the "ac-
tions intended by the insured" clause contradicts these insurance
principles. As described earlier, courts today struggle over the rela-
tionship between the standards for the award of punitive
damages-"willful and wanton," "grossly negligent," "reckless,"
"shocking to the conscience"-and the concept of intent. The sub-
stantial intelligence of the judiciary has enabled many fine
distinctions between these terms to be drawn.
According to the insurance interpretation of the "actions in-
tended" clause, however, the inquiry is different. The question is
not whether behavior that a jury has found reckless or willful and
wanton is equivalent to an action intended by the insured, but
whether the action justifying punitive liability has some probabilis-
tic character or can be distinguished in some way from the moral
hazard of the insured. Put differently, to achieve the dual objec-
tives of enhancing insurance availability and reducing the injury
rate, a court must ask whether the action is one that the dominant
population of insureds would wish excluded from coverage because
its risk of loss is so extreme. Is the risk of loss one that the domi-
nant population of insureds faces with some probabilistic
frequency? Thus, is the risk one for which insurance might reduce
risks? Or is the risk uninsurable because it is not probabilistic and
not invulnerable to insured moral hazard?
The insurance interpretation of the "actions intended by the
insured" clause is substantially different from the current judicial
approach to the problem. Take, for example, the various cases de-
scribed in Part I involving suicides. There are very strong reasons
to believe that the dominant population of insureds would wish to
exclude coverage of losses from suicide or attempted suicide: First,
such losses are not probabilistic. Were there insurance, suicide
would be quintessentially an action involving insured moral haz-
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ard. Second, the voluntary market almost universally excludes
such risks.64
There are many cases inv.olving suicide or attempted suicide,
however, in which victims injured in a suicide attempt have recov-
ered punitive damages and in which courts have interpreted the
underlying policy to provide coverage for punitive liability. For ex-
ample, in Farm & City Insurance Co. u. Potter,6G a person cut the
brake cable of her car and drove off, attempting suicide. Her sub-
sequent multiple collisions injured others and generated punitive
liability. The court held that her auto policy covered punitive dam-
ages because her intent only extended to her own suicide and
because she had attempted, given the situation in which she had
placed herself, to avoid injuries to others.66
An insurance interpretation, however, would suggest the oppo-
site outcome. The actions of the woman were not probabilistic, and
they could directly be described as insured moral hazard. The
availability of auto insurance could be expanded if the higher loss
costs added to the risk pool by such individuals were culled out by
means of a coverage exclusion. In addition, suicides, as a general
matter, are not indifferent to the financial implications of their
acts on dependents and beneficiaries, as the exclusion of coverage
of suicide in life insurance policies attests. Denying insurance cov-
erage of losses related to suicides, thus, might well reduce the
accident rate, if only by shifting the choice of suicide method to a
means less risky to others.
Many other current interpretations of the "actions intended
by the insured" clause would also compel revision under the insur-
ance approach. As described in Part I, much of the dispute over
insurance coverage of punitives derives from differing judicial esti-
mates of the deterrent value of disallowing coverage of punitives.
The current trend toward allowing punitive coverage builds on
modern skepticism of any deterrent effect of punitives at all or of
any independent deterrent effect. For example, in Price u. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity CO.,67 a court allowed coverage of
punitive damages stemming from a drag racing incident in which
the son of an insured driver had been found grossly negligent, wan-
64. See supra note 56.
65. 330 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1983).
66. Potter, 330 N.W.2d at 266.
67. 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
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ton and reckless and, moreover, had had a history of reckless
driving of which the parent was well aware. According to the court,
there was no important public interest in denying coverage of the
punitive liability, since the boy was still subject to criminal penal-
ties including possible loss of license and compulsory attendance at
traffic school, and because the boy's auto insurance rates were
likely to increase.68
According to the insurance approach to the interpretation of
the "actions intended" clause, however, all of these considerations
are largely irrelevant. The description of the boy's actions as
grossly negligent, wanton, or reckless is largely irrelevant. Alterna-
tive criminal penalties are largely irrelevant.69 The insurance issue
is whether the actions of the boy were sufficiently different from
the actions of the dominant set of insureds to justify exclusion or,
in terms of insurance principles, whether his actions either had
some probabilistic character or evidenced moral hazard.
The insurance approach, without difficulty, would deny insur-
ance coverage of the punitive liability. The boy was not a driver
typical of the dominant population of insureds who, by some
probabalistic chance, found himself in a drag race. Drag racing is
moral hazard. The dominant population of insureds does not want
insurance coverage of liability from drag racing, but is likely to
strongly prefer exclusion of such liability (if it were feasible in a
standard auto policy) to reduce the premium for basic coverage.70
Indeed, the parent's knowledge of the boy's previous recklessness
dramatically demonstrates the potential beneficial effects of deny-
ing coverage. Where parents become aware of the financial risks of
allowing uncontrolled children to drive their cars, the injury rate
attributable to young drivers is likely to decline.
Of course, it is possible to give many other examples of how
the "actions intended by the insured" clause would be defined dif-
ferently according to principles of insurance than it is currently
interpreted by the courts. In truth, the opinions in all modern
cases would be different because, to date, no court has defined a
coherent insurance approach to the issue. Even courts denying cov-
erage of punitives on deterrence grounds are innocent of insurance
68. Price, 108 Ariz. at 647, 502 P.2d at 524.
69. Of course, criminal liability is highly suggestive of insured moral hazard.
70. Indeed, the standard automobile warranty excludes coverage of engine losses from
drag racing. See Priest, Product Warranty, supra note 57.
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reasons for deniaL The insurance reasons are stronger than the de-
terrence reasons, since we do not have supporting evidence of a
deterrent effect.
The puzzle remains, however, why insurers have not modified
policies to exclude coverage of punitive liability despite invitations
to do so by the courts.71 The question defined more precisely, how-
ever, is why insurers have not modified policies within the last two
decades as punitive liability has expanded. Prior to the 1970s, the
imposition of punitive liability was infrequent and courts were
much more likely to interpret the "actions intended" clause to ex-
clude coverage.
The basic principles of insurance provide an answer. To the
extent that the scope of punitive liability is extended to a broader
set of underlying actions, the likelihood increases that actions gen-
erating punitive liability will have some probabilistic character or
will be unrelated to insured moral hazard. If so, then the losses
from these actions can be insured. To the extent actions subject to
punitive liability are probabilistic, they are insurable. Perhaps cu-
riously, the expansion of punitive liability enhances the
insurability of punitive damages.
A different way of putting this point is that, as punitive liabil-
ity is expanded to a broader set of underlying activities, the
difference diminishes between actions typical of punitive liability
and actions typical of the dominant set of insureds. As a conse-
quence, insureds prefer an insurance policy defined to provide
general coverage of punitive liability. The reluctance of insurers to
amend basic policies to more precisely exclude coverage of punitive
liability reflects responsiveness to consumer demand for liability
insurance.72
This approach explains why insurers have not responded to
the judicial suggestion of a more precise exclusion, yet have contin-
ued to litigate individual coverage cases. The dominant set of
insureds may prefer general coverage of punitive liability because
of its probabilistic application. Yet the dominant set of insureds
may still benefit by the exclusion of particularly extreme loss-caus-
ing behavior. That is, as the range of behavior generating punitive
71. See, e.g., Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 396, 398·99. 744 P.2d 170, 171. 173·74
(1987).
72. I am grateful to Judyth Pendelrand John Backer of Aetna Life & Casualty for
comments on this point.
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liability increases, a general exclusion might reduce the level of in-
surance, though a more particular-perhaps, case-by-
case-exclusion of especially extreme actions may still increase in-
surance availability. In this view, punitive insurability litigation
derives from the difficulty of incorporating into the basic policy
itself an exclusion more carefully aimed at extreme behavior.
This explanation, too, suggests that the current judicial ap-
proach to the issue should be reversed. Courts today co~monly
invoke the absence of a general exclusion of punitive liability as a
ground for awarding coverage in individual cases.73 But the basic
principles of insurance show that this frames the issue exactly
backwards. The expansion of general punitive liability prevents a
comprehensive exclusion of punitives. Courts, instead, could en-
hance insurance availability and reduce the accident rate by more
vigilant exclusion of coverage in cases of especially extreme
behavior.
Finally, the principles of insurance raise doubts that the ex-
pansion of punitive liability in recent years continues to achieve
the moral function to which such liability aspires. We have seen
that punitive liability has so expanded in modern times as to be-
come probabilistic in nature and, thus, insurable. For it to be
insurable, however, suggests that punitive liability is a realistic
prospect for the dominant population of insureds.
Yet where the dominant population of insureds is subject in a
systematic way to the prospect of punitive damages, the special
moral force of punitive liability disappears. Punitive liability no
longer represents the punishment of morally extreme behavior. Pu-
nitive liability becomes a cost, a mere input, added to other costs
of productive activities. As no more than a normal cost of opera-
tion, punitive liability loses its economic justification, and it loses
its moral justification.
The point can be made more strongly. It is not necessary to
believe that the determinants of insurability are exactly congruent
with the moral grounds for punitive punishment. But the economic
grounds of insurability must surely define a lower bound of mor-
ally justifiable punishment. Losses suffered from actions that are
insurable because probabilistic in character lack the requisite level
of moral depravity to justify punitive liability. It follows that, to
73. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
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the extent the modern expansion has guaranteed the insurability
of punitive liability, the moral justification for punitive liability
has been lost.
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